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Islam in the North Caucasus
Uwe Halbach
1 In the post-Soviet era the central issue in the topic “Islam in the Caucasus” has been
perceived internationally as  the conflict  between Russia and Chechnya.  This  conflict,
which escalated into a war, focussed the spotlight on the North Caucasus as the most
critical  region in the Russian Federation and brought  with it  reminders  of  the anti-
colonial resistance put up by the Muslim mountain peoples in the 19th  century against
Russia's advance into the region, resistance that in some regions had been maintained
right through to the Soviet period. During the pre-national era this resistance had been
based above all  on Islam. In this regional context, the subject of “Islam in the North
Caucasus” involves the ethno-cultural and religious relationships in the Caucasus, but
beyond that the development of Islam in the Russian Federation.
 
The “Renaissance of Islam” in Russia
2 The post-Soviet states in which Islam has a role to play include not least Russia itself,
which according to its own definition is a federation with a multinational and multi-
denominational population1. Of the 21 “national” members of the federation, all republics
with  their  own  constitutions  and  national  autonomy,  nine  belong  historically  and
culturally to the “Islamic world”: in addition to the two Volga republics of Tatarstan and
Bashkortostan,  these  include  seven  republics  in  the  North  Caucasus,  including  the
breakaway  “Chechen  Republic  of  Ichkeria”.  There  are  also  Muslim  communities  in
western Russia, including Moscow, the Volga-Urals region and Siberia.
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3 It  is  of  course only true to a very limited extent that federal  republics consisting of
Muslim “titular nations” can be considered part  of  the “Islamic world”.  Their titular
nationalities often represent only a minority of the population, and underlie to a lesser or
greater extent a demographic and cultural “Russification”. In only a small number of
republics does the titular nation's cultural background carry sufficient weight to allow
one to speak of Russia's “domestic foreign nations”. This epithet is most appropriate to
the Chechen Republic, which insists on its independence.
4 After the liberalisation of religious policy under Gorbachev at the end of the 1980's a
number of mosques were built and re-opened, even in Russia. On 1st January 1991 there
were 870  registered mosques  (and a  total  of  1,602 in the  Soviet  Union).  The largest
numbers  were  found  in  the  autonomous  republics  of  Daghestan  (240),  Chechen-
Ingushetia (162)  Tatarstan (91) and Bashkortostan (65)2.  In addition to new mosques,
various Islamic institutions sprang up: cultural centres, scientific institutes, new religious
administrative  bodies,  and  others.  Organisations  like  the  “Union  of  the  Muslims  of
Russia” became a part of the country's political life and attempted to form their own
Muslim electorate in parliamentary elections.
5 As in Central Asia, Islam represents a broad spectrum in Russia, and it is anything but a
cultural monolith. The many faces of Islam here include traditional and reformist, Sufi
and orthodox, folkloric and academic variations. The spectrum of “Muslim” peoples in
the  Russian  Federation  stretches  from  the  Volga  Tatars,  who  have  very  strong
connections  with  Russia  and  the  Russians,  to  ethnic  groups  in  Daghestan  living  in
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traditionalistic  local  cultures,  and  the  Chechens,  whose  inclusion  in  the  multiracial
empire was associated with extreme violence, and who have never been fully integrated
into the Russian and Soviet system of rule.
 
Peculiarities of the region
6 Of all the parts of Russia with national federal republics, the North Caucasus3 is the most
complicated. This is due to certain peculiarities, which must be detailed before we go on
to discuss Islam in the region.
7 1.  The extremely  diverse  ethnic  population has  been a  distinguishing feature  of  the
region since ancient times. Although in 1989 Russians accounted for 67% of the regional
population,  they were in a minority in federal  republics such as Daghestan (9%) and
Chechen-Ingushetia (26%).  The indigenous population groups represent an ethnic and
linguistic  panorama,  from  Caucasian,  Indo-European  and  Turkish  backgrounds.  The
political structuring of the region during the Soviet era clashed with this complicated
ethnogram. Binational creations such as Kabardino-Balkaria illustrated the absurdity of
the administrative  attempt  to  build  the Soviet  nation in the region.  In  its  historical
pattern of settlement, Russia has repeatedly used force since it first conquered Caucasia.
Its repulsion of resistance in the 19th century, its imposition of forced resettlements, the
formation of questionable national territorial units during the Soviet era, conceived by
bureaucrats and repeatedly modified, and finally the deportation of whole populations in
1943-1944, have undermined the relationship between ethnic group and territory here
more than in any other region. And this process continues today. In the North Caucasus
there have been renewed incidences of expulsions and flights of populations, for example
Ingush refugees from North Ossetia and refugees from the war in Chechnya.
8 2. By the end of the Soviet era, national movements opposing the local ruling elite and
Moscow had arisen in some republics; binational republics were threatening to split, and
ethno-territorial conflicts had arisen.
9 To counter this ethnic fragmentation, in 1989 a transnational movement was begun, the
aim of which was to form a republic of the mountain peoples based on an historical
model.  Since 1992 this has been called the “Confederation of Caucasian Peoples” and
represents 16 peoples of the North Caucasus, including some without their own state or
autonomous territory.
10 3.  The North Caucasus has enormous socio-economic problems,  and these have been
considerably  worsened by  the  population movements,  border  closures  and economic
blockades resulting from the war in Chechnya.
11 4. Ethno-political and territorial conflicts in the North Caucasus are interconnected with
similar conflicts in the now independent trans-Caucasian states, particularly in the case
of Georgia. This gave rise to a complicated situation of conflict, which applies across the
whole of Caucasia. The tensions in the North Caucasus are also making an impact on
Southern Russia.
12 5.  Some  observers  have  identified  lines  of  fragmentation,  caused  by  a  “clash  of
civilisations”  between  Russian  Orthodox  culture  and  the  culture  of  the  Caucasian
mountain peoples, characterised by Islam and the customary law (“Adat”). In particular,
relations  between  the  Cossacks  and  the  mountain  peoples  could  represent  a  line  of
fragmentation  for  such  a  “clash  of  civilisations”.  However,  the  logic  of  a  “clash  of
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civilisations” as described by Huntington is not formed in Caucasus. Confrontations and
alliances  in  such  clashes  cut  across  religious  differences :  Orthodox  Cossacks  are
supporting Muslim Abkhazians against Christian Georgians, Georgians have joined with
Muslim Ingush in their conflict with a mixture of Muslim and Christian Ossetians, etc.
Who is a friend or a foe is decided on the basis of political, territorial, economic and other
interests, which are stronger than religious criteria.
13 6.  In recent years the geostrategic significance of the peripheral Caucasianregion has
gained in importance for Russia. This is due in large part to the growing importance of
the Caspian petroleum-and-natural-gas-producing region and the disputes surrounding
export channels and pipelines.
14 The combination of historical,  demographic,  ethnographic,  economic and geostrategic
factors outlined here has created a delicate situation in the North Caucasus.  Neither
Russia's regional policy nor the political ability of the local ruling elite has been able to
deal with this predicament.
 
The religious history of the North Caucasus
15 The religious history of this region is as complicated as its ethnography. The changing
influence of non-local powers has kept the cultural and religious geography of the North
Caucasus dynamic. Animism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam and other religions are all part
of the picture. The Khazar empire, Byzantium, Armenia, Georgia, the Arabic Caliphate,
the Golden Horde, the Crimean Tatar khanate, the Ottoman empire and finally Russia
have  all  had  a  religious  influence  on  the  region4.  The  Islamisation  of  the  mountain
peoples took place over a period stretching from the 8th to the 19th centuries5. The Ingush,
for example, were converted to Islam partly through the Sufi activities connected with
the Caucasus war in the 19th century. Because the region is such an ethnic and cultural
melting pot, and one which came into contact with older religions, the local Islam (or
rather, local Islams) became mixed with pre-Islamic religions and cultures. This resulted
in  a  contrast  between  eastern  and  western  Islamisation,  between  Daghestan  on  the
Caspian Sea and Cherkassia on the Black Sea. For the most part, religious law was not able
to replace the tribal common law that was in place locally. In everyday life, “Adat” held
sway  among  the  Caucasian  ethnic  groups,  with  “Sharia”  gaining  acceptance  only
temporarily (during the “Holy War” and in the Imamat of Shamil), and even then only to
a limited extent.
16 Nevertheless, in the eastern part of the region, which was particularly fragmented along
ethnic lines, a remarkable process of Islam-based integration occurred. In the 18th and 19
th centuries it was the religious authorities that transcended narrow ethnic and tribal
boundaries  to  bring  the  mountain  peoples  together  in  anti-colonial  resistance
movements, giving them state-like forms of organisation. It was the Sufi variety of Islam
that  formed the ideological  framework for  the resistance.  From the turn of  the 19th
century  Sufi  orders  (Naqshbandi,  Qadiri)  had  a  decisive  influence  over  the  religious
allegiance of the population and its continued resistance to foreign rule by “infidels”. The
system  of  organisation  of  the  Sufi  brotherhoods and  the  subordinate  relationship
between pupil (“murid”) and master (“sheikh”, “murshid”), known as “muridism”, were
adopted as the structure for the resisting community,and, in the Imamat of Shamil, this
crystallised into an actual “Islamic state”, until its capitulation in 18596. The ideological
basis for the “Holy War”, the “ghaza-wat” in the Caucasus was the turning towards Sharia
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and the call to strengthen the faith while at the same time resisting foreign rule by non-
believers. Afterwards too, despite persecution by the Russian colonial authorities, it was
the Sufi orders that were mainly responsible for preserving the ethno-religious identity
and organising resistance, particularly in Chechnya and large parts of Daghestan. The
“murid” parts of the North Caucasus resisted being integrated into the Tsarist and later
the Soviet system of rule for longer than any other region ruled by Russia7. In Chechnya
the  Sufi  system  of  organisation  combined  with  the  clan  and  social  organization
structures, and this combination kept the Chechens going even during their fight for
survival, as it did after the 1944 deportation8.
17 Since 1994, this dimension of national self-assertion has been frequently referred to even
in the Russian press in connection with the war in Chechnya9. Despite the fact that, after
1917, the patterns of identification shifted from a religious to an ethnic basis, or were
forced to shift by “Soviet nation building”, in today's political and national movements in
the region reference is still made to the religious symbolism of the pre-national period
and to names such as Shamil10. This symbolism appeared in the Chechen fighting units: in
the green headbands worn by the “boeviki”,  in the connection between fighting and
prayer, or in the symbolic meaning given to the fact that one of the best-known Chechen
field commanders (Basaev) had the first name “Shamil” and came from Vedeno, once the
chief town of the murids.
18 But we should be wary of sensationalising the role of Islam, even in the special case of
Chechnya. During the Caucasian war in the 19th century, the Caucasian mountain peoples
were presented as “Muslim fanatics”, both in Russia and in Western Europe. A Russian
author, A. Marlinski, who painted a picture of the “gorcy” (mountain peoples) as “worthy
opponents”, wrote at the time how pleasant the Caucasus would be were it not for three
things: “plague, cholera and Mohammedanism”11. While the self-defence of these ethnic
groups  was  met  with  somesympathy  even  among  their Russian  opponents,  and  the
romantic aspect of the “noble savage” was idealised in the literature of the time, Russian
and Western European authors described the Islamic motivation for the fight for freedom
as being characterised by fanaticism and ignorance.12 These cliches have also been found
more recently in the conflict between Moscow and Chechen secessionism.
 
The current development of Islam in the North
Caucasus
19 If one measures the “renaissance of Islam” in Russia since the end of the 1980's in terms
of  the  numbers  of  new and re-opened mosques,  the  increase  in  numbers  of  Islamic
communities and other quantitative criteria, the North Caucasus has played a particularly
prominent role in this process. Today, practically every inhabited point in the Islamic
parts of the region once again has its own mosque. The murid facet of Caucasian Islam,
which was driven underground during Soviet supremacy, has also played its part in this.
“Muridism” remained one of the national religious and socio-cultural constants, which
Sovietisation was unable to eliminate. Towards the end of the 1920's, more than 40% of
the adult male population of Chechen-Ingushetia are thought to have been members of
various branches of the order, and depending economically on their “murshids”. But in
contrast to its historical achievement, today muridism is partially responsible not for the
integration of Muslims, but for organisational fragmentation and local differentiation in
Islam. At the end of the 1980's studies on Islam in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR revealed the
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existence of more than 200 murid groups with a total membership of 12,000. A number of
descendants  of  the  murid  heroes  from  the  19th century  Caucasus  wars  live  in
neighbouring Daghestan. According to data from 1993, seven orders and a number of
subdivisions  are  active  here.  While  in  Chechnya membership  to  the  different  orders
corresponded  to  membership  to  a  particular  tribe  or  “taip”,  in  Daghestan  this
corresponded with membership to one of the many ethnic groups of this small multi-
cultural republic13.
20 Russian and international reporting of the war in Chechnya focussed on aspects which
corresponded to the public's perception of the cliche of a “religious war” - for example
the hostage-taking episodes in the summer of 1995 and January 1996, during which the
leaders of the Chechen commandos were presented to the world's television viewers in
the garb of religious fighters, with their followers wearing green headbands. Once the
war was ended by the agreement between Lebed and Maskhadov, concluded in Novye
Atagi  and  Khasavyurt  in  August  1996,  the  Russian  press  abounded  with  articles
interpreting this development also as a surrender “to Islamic fundamentalism”.  They
claimed that Russia had thereby worsened its “geopolitical” position with respect to the
Islamic world:  “The leaders of the separatists have always been supported by Islamic
fundamentalism, either openly or secretly, and also by international economic powers
with an interest in Russia's disintegration. It is known that Dudaev travelled to Turkey
and met with representatives of Muslim countries. [...] In Chechnya itself a total plan to
form groups of Islamic fighters was put into practice, with the idea of later causing the
whole of the Caucasus to explode. This plan was based on the principle of a “Holy War”
against the non-believers, with the expulsion of the entire non-Vainakh population from
the territory of the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”. [...] Instruction and indoctrination
was carried out under the leadership of specialists from Saudi Arabia,  Egypt,  Turkey,
Afghanistan and other countries. The idea is presumably to continue as follows: after the
withdrawal of the federal troops the Chechens would attack Russia's southern regions.
[...]  Chechnya  would  thus  become  an  explosive  device,  igniting  not  only  the  North
Caucasus and then the Russian Federation but also blowing apart the stability of the
whole of the Muslim world14.”
21 Fears of a “fundamentalist expansion” out of the Caucasus had previously been stirred up
by  concentrating  on  the  Islamic  symbolism  of  the  Chechen  resistance.  At  a  press
conference on February 21st, 1996, Yeltsin accused Dudaev of having ambitions to conquer
the whole of the Caucasus in order to establish an “Islamic state” by also including the
trans-Caucasian regions, in other words the Christian countries of Georgia and Armenia.
At the same time his defence minister announced that “Russia's strategic enemies” were
behind the fighting, “because they want to divide Russia, occupy part of her territory and
cut off access to the Caspian and Black Seas.”15 The finger was pointed particularly at
Turkey, which was accused of being central to this “strategic hostility” and of supporting
the Chechen “bandits”16.
22 These claims were countered in Russia by historical arguments put forward by specialists
in Middle Eastern studies, who warned the authorities above all not to turn the political
conflict  into a  religious  one.  To counter  the portrayal  of  the “Chechen Islamists”  as
insatiable warmongers, in his analysis of the much-criticised Khasavyurt agreements an
expert  in  Islamic  law  objected  that  these  were  entirely  justified  by  the  Islamic
interpretation of international law17.
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23 During the escalation of the friction between Moscow and Grozny in 1994, it was above all
the clergy on both sides who opposed warmongering and the view that religion was
playing a central role in this political conflict. However, over the course of the clash and
particularly during the war from the end of 1994, religion did become a more significant
component of the conflict.  But “Islamic secessio-nism” was of course not a model for
Russia's Muslims, nor even for Chechnya's immediate neighbours. The republic in the
federation where Islam is most widespread, Daghestan, had one overriding concern: to
remain  outside  the  conflict  between  Moscow  and  Grozny.  Dudaev  did  obtain  some
assistance from Islamic supporters abroad (from the Chechen community in Jordan, from
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and from Saudi Arabia where the diplomatically isolated republic
had been maintaining a trade mission since 1992).  Dudaev's forces are likely to have
included  some  volunteers  from various  Islamic  and  non-Islamic  countries  (including
some  from  the  Ukraine  and  the  Baltic  states)  and  Afghanistan  veterans.  Butoverall
“Islamic solidarity” with the breakaway republic was limited, both close to Russia and
further afield. No government from the Islamic world dared to snub Russia by officially
recognising Chechen secession, and with an eye on their own “territorial integrity”, most
of these states could scarcely afford to legitimise secession.
24 And in Chechnya itself,  neither a religious nor an ethnic “nation” had come together
behind Dudaev; if he had become the embodiment of national integration this was due to
Moscow's reaction to the breakaway republic. Dudaev tried to base his politics on Islamic
sentiment and to blend religion with nationalism, for example in his 1993 attempt to
introduce Islamic legal norms into the new constitution. But not only did parliament
stress that the March 1992 constitution of  the Chechen republic was a secular one18,
Chechnya's official Islam leaders also took up a moderate position. In September 1994 the
“muftiat” issued a fatwa forbidding Chechens to use weapons in political disagreements.
In  January  1994  Islamic  dignitaries  from Chechnya  had met  with  the  Russian  prime
minister to discuss a peaceful means of resolving the conflict19.
25 The  official  clergy  opposed  Dudaev's  domestic  and  foreign  policy.  An  independent
Chechen muftiat had been formed in 1991. On October 14th,  1991, a council of imams
elected  a  new  mufti  and  founded  under  his  leadership  an  Independent  Religious
Authority  of  the  Muslims of  the  Chechen Republic.  The muftiat  clergy criticised the
economic slowdown and decline in the rule of law under the Dudaev regime, while the
regime set up its own Islamic authorities20.
26 On Dudaev's side and supporting the radical national movement were Islamic parties such
as the “Muslim brothers” (the first branch on ex-Soviet territory, founded in Grozny in
the summer of  1992),  the “Islamic Cultural  Centre of  the Chechen Republic” and the
“Islamic  Path”  party.  This  latter  party  was  one of  the  protagonists  of  the  “Chechen
revolution” of 1991. It was founded in 1990 by Beslan Gan-temirov, a comrade-in-arms
and later an opponent of Dudaev, and at the beginning of the secession provided the core
unit of the “National Guard”, but had only limited influence among the population. The
national  branch  of  the  union-wide  IPW,  founded  in  December  1990,  was  also  not
particularly successful and broke up after secession. The main ideological support for
Dudaev's  planned  secession  was  provided  not  by  an  Islamic  party  but  by  a  secular
nationalist party,  the “Vainakh Democratic Party” under the leadership of Zelimkhan
Jandarbiev.  The  Chechen revolution was  supported by elements  of  the  lower  clergy,
imams from the village mosques and murid activists, particularly members of the Kunta-
Hadji  order  and  the  so-called  “dhikr  followers”  (Russian  zikristy)21.  Dudaev  used  the
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influenceof this particularly active branch of the order from the Qadiri brotherhood. One
of its ustazy (religious leaders) was his eldest brother Bekmurza Dudaev. Geographically,
the strongest support for Dudaev was in the south of the republic, in so-called “Ichkeria”,
where the Kunta-Hadji order was dominant22.
27 The regime tried to use Islam as an element of national self-determination to consolidate
the independence of the state and to strengthen its own position of power. And Dudaev
went considerably further than that, propagating a joint anti-imperial front of Caucasian
Muslims against Moscow, co-operating with the “Confederation of Caucasian Peoples”,
and finally also appealing across religious dividing lines to the Christian peoples of the
Caucasus. It was no longer Islam alone but the common anti-imperialist consciousness
that was to form the basis of a “Caucasian house”.
28 With a feeling for the historical roots of national self-assertion in the face of colonial
power, Dudaev used the symbolism of the 19th century murid wars, building a bridge from
the first significant Chechen resistance fighter Mansur Ushurma via the Imamat of Shamil
to his own resistance to the “empire”, in other words from the end of the 18th century to
the 1991 “Chechen Revolution”. One of his first decrees in November 1991 called upon the
Muslims living in Moscow to turn the Russian capital into “a state of emergency area (
zonu bedstviya) in the name of our freedom from non-believers”23. This rhetoric contained
echoes of the “jihad” anti-colonial position, which made a legal distinction between the
world of Islam and that of the infidels or peace-haters. It was not difficult to portray
Russia as the dar al-harb to one's own compatriots, since the history of Russian-Chechen
relations since the end of the 18th century had been characterised by a chain of violence.
29 The Russian military intervention of December 1994 and its degeneration into a terrorist
war against Chechnya's civil population then fully opened up the arsenal of memories
stretching from the punishments of Tsarist officers to the 1944 deportation of almost
500,000  Chechens  and  Ingush,  and  beyond.  In  this  context  Islam  became  a  more
significant driving force behind the resistance, but the difference between the northern
and southern parts of the republic also increased. However, reports of this came mostly
from Russian sources. According to them, in 1995 the population in the areas under the
military control of Dudaev's forces – predominantly the mountainous southern part of
Chechnya – lived according to Islamic law. The northern part was more in the control of
the federal forces and the changing pro-Russian administrations, but was not immune to
some resistance activity. One Russian analyst summed up the situation thus: in the south,
guerrilla,  in  the  north,  intifada24.  This  regional  difference  corresponds  to  religious
allegiance  to  particular  Sufi  organisations.  In  the  19th century  the  Naqshbandi
brotherhoods preferred to support the jihad, while the Kunta-Hadji  clergy,  who came
from the Qadiri tradition, were in favour of making peace with Russia, but today their
positions have been reversed.  The Naqshbandi followers,  predominantly found in the
north of the republic, tended to oppose the confrontation advocated by Dudaev, and in
contrastboth the Qadiri branches and the Kunta-Hadji orders supported the secessionist
regime, which was increasingly looking for support in the mountainous southern region.
The renaming of the republic as the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”, declared the claim to
power of the southern taips, Dudaev's followers and in religious terms the Qadiri. This was
carried through by  the  August  1996  boeviki offensive  on Grozny and the  subsequent
withdrawal  of  Russian troops and ousting of  the pro-Russian “puppet regime” under
Doku Zavgaev. Towards the end of 1996 there was only one region that remained against
the separatists, Zavgaev's home town of Benoy Yurt. In contrast, in 1994 regions such as
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Urus-Martan and the so-called Terek district had rebelled against Dudaev25. The victors of
the internal Chechen conflict and the confrontation with Moscow are now putting into
place a post-war order based on Islamic norms; they are turning the jihad or ghazawat –
which they now see as won with respect to Moscow – inward, with the aim of using it to
consolidate the sovereignty of the republic and for reconstruction. The analogy here is
not  with  modern  “Islamic  fundamentalism”,  as  claimed  in  the  Russian  press  and
frequently also in the Western press, but with the 19th century history of the region. From
the 1840's to 1859, the Imamat of Shamil was a prime example of the coming together of
the external and the internal, the “small” and the “great jihad”. There is of course some
disagreement between the various political powers in the breakaway republic over the
type of “Islamisation” desirable in post-war Chechnya. After his election, the president
and head of government Maskhadov wants to introduce in Chechnya the norms and laws
of the Sharia cautiously, so as not to violate the common law of the mountain peoples and
the justicial systems of other religious communities. The field commanders Basaev and
Raduev are in favour of a radical and aggressive interpretation of religious law. After he
was elected president, Maskhadov decreed that all government buildings must provide a
prayer room and that all female government employees must wear a green headscarf.
Russian observers such as Igor Rotar predict that Maskhadov will have problems keeping
his  house  in  order  in  the  face  of  diverging  ethno-cultural  and  religious  powers  in
Chechnya, such as competition from the traditional Sufi tarikat and hostility towards the
Sufis from the “wahhabi” movement led by the Jordanian field commander Khattab26.
30 Compared  to  Russia's  Muslim  elite,  which  is  largely  committed  to  the  unity  of  the
federation and preserving its territorial integrity, in Chechnya opinion is divided. The
Sufi brotherhoods are largely critical of the official clergy, accusing them of collaborating
with the “foreign religious state” (inoverskoe gosudarstvo).  On the other hand, expelled
Chechens living in central Russia are largely behind the Russian muftiat clergy27.
31 With growing political turbulences in the post-war Chechnya religious cleavages gained
momentum. Since 1997 the term “Wahhabi” has become the dominating catch-word in all
descriptions of political-religious developments in Chechnia and the North-Caucasus in
the  Russian  mass-media.  “It  is  used  indiscriminately  to  describe  modernist,
fundamentalist, puritanical Islamic movements that reject theauthority of the traditional
religious  structures.  With very  few exceptions  these  new Wahhabis  do  not  have  the
slightest knowledge of Muhammad Abd Ibn al-Wahhab's doctrine and the movements
which it inspired, such as the Ikhwan al-muslimin (Muslim Brothers) and the Wahhabi
movement in India. However, without expounding on the finer points of Islamic doctrine,
one can say that the political and social profile of some Wahhabis in Chechnya is similar
to that of Islamic fundamentalists in other parts of the Muslim world28.” First groups of
“Wahhabis” had appeared in the North Caucasus, mainly in Daghestan, at the time of the
creation of  the Islamic Renaissance Party in the early 1990s.  During the first  war in
Chechnya they formed an “Islamic battalion” made up of foreign volunteers under the
command of Khattab. After the war they appeared as the forces with the strongest and
most radical appeal for an Islamic state in Chechnya and for its expansion over the whole
of the “Muslim Caucasus”. “Wahhabis” were represented in the power structures of the
post-war “Chechen republic of Ichkeria”, and controlled the Shariah tribunals. They got
into growing opposition to the less radical  president Maskhadov.  According to Marie
Bennigsen  they  committed  two  major  political  mistakes  –  confronting  the  Sufi
brotherhoods and rejecting nationalism29. In the name of the transnational “Umma” they
Islam in the North Caucasus
Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 115 | 2001
9
aggressively advocated a union with Daghestan, the cradle of Islam in the North and
Eastern  Caucasus.  Prominent  Chechen politicians  and field-commanders  like  Movladi
Udugov, Selimkhan Yandarbiev and Shamil Bassaev promoted parties and organizations
dedicated to this purpose like the “Congress of the peoples of Ichkeria and Daghestan”. In
1998 the internal political and religious antagonisms in Chechnya developed into violent
clashes, a constitutional crisis and new confrontations with Russia,  which missed any
measure  for  a  restabilization  of  the  North  Caucasus  and  for  economic  help  for  the
breakaway republic according to a commitment,  made in the peace agreements with
Chechnya in 1996 and 1997.  Moscow didn't  support  president Maskhadov against  his
more radical opponents. The situation was complicated by the activity of criminal groups,
autonomous field commanders and Islamist forces, the main protagonists of which were
the commanders Shamil Bassaev, Salman Raduev, Khunkar Israpilov and Khattab. This
development  culminated  in  the  incursion  of  “Islamist  insurgents”  of Chechen,
Daghestanian and other nationality under the command of Bassaev and Khattab into the
Western part of Daghestan in the summer 1999, giving Moscow the pretext for a new, but
not at  all  spontaneous military intervention into Chechnya under the formula “Anti-
Terrorist-Campaign”.  With  this  second  Chechnya-War,  Russia  did  not  at  all  prevent
growing Islamist influences from abroad on her Caucasian periphery, but created a case
of Islamic solidarity.
 
Islam in Daghestan
32 Judging by the composition of its population and its ethno-cultural diversity and cultural
and religious history, Daghestan is the most idiosyncratic of all the Muslim parts of Russia
and the former Soviet Union. A. Malashenko describes thissmall mountainous republic
with its dozens of peoples30 as a miniature model of the Islamic religious community in
the former Soviet Union31. But the Islam found in Daghestan also has certain peculiarities
that differentiate it from the Islam found in the rest of the former Soviet Union. These
include first and foremost an Arabic-influenced tradition more developed than anywhere
else  in the ex-Soviet  Orient  and one that  continued until  the Soviet  era.  Daghestani
Muslims also stand out in terms of their legal teachings and rites: the majority of them
are Shafi'i, in contrast to their predominantly Hanafi fellow Muslims in Russia and the
CIS.
33 In Daghestan the Islamic scholars were highly influential and had a great deal of contact
with the Arabic world, deep into Southern Arabia. Before 1917 there were some 2,000
religious  schools  here  with  40,000  pupils  studying  Arabic  language,  literature  and
theology.  In the early Soviet era there were more than 2,500 mosques.  Thousands of
Islamic scholars, known popularly as “Arabists”, formed a broad and well-educated class
(5% of the population in 1917). In Daghestan old Arabic manuscripts were preserved as
sources of religious traditions32. Here, Islam was deeply rooted in written tradition – in
contrast to other areas, particularly the nomadic Muslim regions of Eurasia. In Daghestan
this Arabic literature was accessible not just to a small circle of scholars, but to a broad
section of the population. Arabic remained the lingua franca in this part of the Caucasus
right through to the Soviet era. The study of Arabic and the Koran in informal circles
contributed to the “renaissance” of Islam at the collapse of the Soviet Union. But popular
Islam and Sufi traditions were also rooted in Daghestan, and local forms of worship and a
network of holy places contributed to the particular character of the country and the
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local ethnicity of its melting pot of peoples. Here too, memories of muridism and the
Imamat of Shamil became the crux of historical  identity.  The anti-colonial  resistance
supported by Sufi organisations continued way beyond the end of the state-sponsored
resistance in 1859 and into the twentieth century. The defeat of the last ghazawat in the
early 1920's by the Red Army destroyed large parts of Daghestan33. In January 1921 the
Soviets founded the Daghestani ASSR. But as was the case in Chechnya, this part of the
North and East Caucasus was integrated only superficially into the Soviet system. From a
cultural  point  of  view  it  remained  independent,  and  tribal  traditions  and  religious
organisations played a decisive role – despite vehement persecution of the clergy and in
particular the Sufi organisations by the Soviet power. But Daghestan's history during the
Soviet era differs from Chechnya's in a number of important ways:  Daghestanis were
neither  deported  nor  faced  with  an  influx  of  immigrants,  and  they  were  better
represented in the local power structures. Their relationship with the Soviet power was
less confrontational than that of the Chechens. Today, the Federal Republic of Daghestan
is characterised by dualism between the Soviet conservative ruling elite and an “Islamic
renaissance”.
34 Between 1988 and 1992 the number of active mosques increased from 27 to more than
800, and today this figure is in the thousands. Since the beginning of the 1990's thousands
of Daghestani Muslims have once again been taking part in pilgrimages to Mecca,  in
greater  numbers  than  Muslims  from Central  Asia.  Today,  the  leaders  of  the  Islamic
communities  and  Islamic  scholars  once  again  have  an  influential  role  in  local
government. This applies particularly to the squabbles about land, which have increased
in intensity in the post-Soviet period.
35 In  the  small  republic  of  Daghestan  alone  there  are  five  Islamic  institutes:  one  in
Makhatchkala, Gergebil and Kizlyar and two in the city of Buynaksk, which has become
the North Caucasus centre of Islamic education. Since the autumn of 1992 the Islamic
religion is also taught at the secondary level in state schools.  Almost all  of  the local
parties which stood in the Russian parliamentary elections in 1993 and 1995 made Islam
an election issue, and there was even discussion over whether it should be made the state
religion and whether teaching the Koran in schools should be made compulsory34.
36 This picture of the “Islamic renaissance” does however require some qualification: Islam
has not yet managed to unite the various peoples in Daghestan into a nation founded on
religion; it does not prevent ethno-political and ethno-territorial conflicts; and at its own
organisational  level  it  is  highly  fragmented.  Because  of  the  considerable  ethnic
differences in the various parts of Daghestan, the “Islamic renaissance” has occurred to
varying degrees: it has taken place above all in the north-west part of the republic and
has taken a stronger hold in the Avar-Dargin and Kumyk regions than in central and
southern areas (among the Laks, Lezgians, Tabassaran, Rutul and other ethnic groups).
During the Soviet era the Avars, Kumyk and Dargins held on more tightly than other
ethnic  groups to the Arabic  tradition and popular  Islam,  with its  substitutes  for  the
forbidden pilgrimage to Mecca (the tradition of the ziyarat, a pilgrimage to various local
shrines). Islamic revivalist movements sprang up as early as the 1970's in these areas,
where under Khrushchev 200,000 Muslims from the Avar-Dargin highlands had been
forcibly resettled. It was particularly in these forced resettlements that a renaissance of
muridism occurred, resulting in an extremely sharp response from the Soviet authorities.
There is an interesting parallel here to a similar process in Tajikistan. The Soviets had
been  implementing  a  policy  of  “national  consolidation”  and  had  encouraged  the
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assimilation of small ethnic groups into Daghestan's larger ethnic groups. This meant
that the small groups of mountain peoples were divided up into a series of larger groups,
between which there was a struggle to gain representation in the local power structures.
In the post-Soviet era, ethno-political conflicts that had been swept under the carpet for
years came to the surface.
37 Here,  the  “Islamic  renaissance”  was  particularly  badly  affected  by  the  maelstrom of
political ethnicity, and Islam in the republic became divided along the lines of nationality.
At the first congress of North Caucasus Muslims, in May 1989, the leader of the North
Caucasus  religious  authority  (the  DUMSK),  Mufti  Gekkiev,  resigned.  The  DUMSK
consequently splintered into sections representing thevarious republics, and in turn the
Daghestani section further divided into ethnic districts. This resulted in an independent
religious authority for the Kumyk, a Qadiyat for the Dargins, and in 1995 the Laks and
Lezgians obtained their own authorities.
38 Outside  these  religious  administrative  bodies,  Islam-based political  parties  came into
being.  The  “Jamaat-ul-Muslimin”  movement  under  the  leadership  of  Khasbulat
Khasbulatov  became  a  particularly  active  contributor  to  the  religious  agitation  that
occurred in 1991 as a result of the increase in the cost of the pilgrimage to Mecca. During
this period Islamic movements representing all of the ideological variations sprang up in
Daghestan:  proponents  of  the  Enlightenment,  fundamentalists  and  reformers  all
conflicted with one another. One grouping, described as “moderately fundamentalist”,
was the regional branch of the IPW, while “Jamaat-ul-Muslimin” was a more radical one.
Elements  in  the  intelligentsia  spoke  out  against  religious  radicalism  and  in  1989
associated themselves with the Islamic Democratic Party led by the human rights activist
Abdurashid Saidov.  This party declared itself  in favour of  the reforms in Russia – in
contrast to Daghestan's political  leaders,  who are some of Russia's most conservative
regional  elites.  The party gained authority,  particularly through its  stand on the co-
existence of different nationalities and cultures in Daghestan.
39 The majority of the Islamic communities in the largest ethnic group, the Avars, were on
the side of the republic government. Opposing them are the religious movements of those
nationalities that were disadvantaged during the Soviet era and which protest about the
dominance of the Avars in Daghestani national life: Kumyk, Dargins, Lezgians and Laks. It
is the small groups of mountain peoples who are particularly dissatisfied, peoples whose
national identity was at stake during the Soviet era. In addition to Islamic parties, from
the end of  the 1980's  national  popular  fronts  such as  the Kumyk “Tenglik”  (Justice)
appeared, and these groups stood for the political equality of their ethnic groups and
controversial territorial claims. But in addition there are integrationist tendencies that
are in favour of preserving the multi-ethnic stability and the state nature of Daghestan.
Some members of the clergy have called for the muftiats to be united.
40 All this makes Daghestan an interesting subject of study in the ethno-religious function of
Islam in the former Soviet Union. Its multi-ethnic structure prevents both a monolithic
Islamic movement and a dominant titular nationalism35. But all of the national
movements in the republic return to Islam as the roots of their cultural identity. As a
result,  Islam has become a common denominator for the breaking up of the national
identity in the ethnic labyrinth. It has become the catalyst for nationalism that could
blow apart Daghestan's multi-ethnic system, but at the same time it also represents an
internally stabilising factor. Since there is no single titular nation, it has become a means
of communication between the ethnic groups, just as it did in the mountainous regions in
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the  pre-Soviet  era  when  Arabic  was  the  language  spoken.  The  greatest  threat  to
Daghestan's  stability  was  the  war  in  neighbouring  Chechnya.  Against  all  the  odds,
Daghestan was able to stay out of the conflict between Moscow and Dudaev, but was
adversely affected by border closures, refugee movements and fighting spilling over onto
its territory. Despite strong historical links such as the Imamat of Shamil and the murid
tradition,  Islamic  solidarity  with  its  neighbour  has  its  limits  in  Daghestan.
Demonstrations  of  solidarity  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  did  not  spread  to  mass
movements. The official clergy and even the leaders of the Islamic parties avoid talking of
a ghazawat. Economically speaking, Daghestan could afford an abrupt separation from
Russia even less than Chechnya, since it depended on the Federal budget for more than
90% of its income and has fewer natural economic resources than its neighbour. For the
last five years the people of Daghestan have no longer been receiving any financial aid
from Moscow. Unemployment has reached massive proportions, and border closures and
transport shortages have destroyed entire economic sectors.
41 The impact of Chechnya on Daghestan was already strong during the first war in 1995 and
1996, and it grew after the war. “Relations in the border regions (Vedeno, Andi and Dido
territories, Khasavyurt and Nozhay Yurt) were never interrupted with rebels, exiles and
outlaws continuing to find refuge on both sides of the border”36. After the war there was a
certain  analogy  in  the  development  of  “Wahhabi”  movements  in  both  republics.  In
Daghestan the societal and cultural conditions for the development of that phenomenon
were even better  than in  Chechnia,  though the  “Wahhabis”  never  got  in  a  majority
neither in Chechnya nor in Daghestan. In 1997 a book by a Daghestani author, Magomed
Tagaev, entitled “Our Struggle or the Army of Insurrection of the Imam”, which was
published in Kiev,  provoked heated debates  in Russian specialist  circles.  It  described
insurrection scenarios of pan-Caucasian dimension based on Islam; and these scenarios
seemed to become true when local “Wahhabites” took control of some villages in the
Buynaksk district of Daghestan and put them under Sharia-Law, and when the already
mentioned movements for a unification of Chechnya and Daghestan, like the “Congress of
the  peoples  of  Ichkeria  and  Daghestan”  promoted  the  idea  of  an  Islamic  motivated
elimination of Russian dominance in the Caucasus. The decisive event in that context was
the  incursion  by  groups  of  boeviki (fighters)  from Chechnya  to  the  Western  part  of
Daghestan under the command of Chechen field commanders in August 1999. Though the
reaction  to  the  incursion  by  broad  circles  within  the  population  of  Daghestan
demonstrated that expectations of an all-encompassing transethnic Islamic resurrection
in the North-Caucasus were totally wrong, Moscow took that event as a reason for a new
military intervention in this region and the second Chechen-War.
 
The Outlook
42 Russian  religious,  regional  and  nationality  policies  have  to  deal  with  a  number  of
religious  communities,  which  since  the  end  of  the  1980's  have  been  experiencing  a
“religious renaissance”. In addition to Islam, these include Buddhism-Lamaism, which
provides  a  national  cultural  background for  federal  republics  such as  Buryatia,  Tuva
(Tyva)  and  Kalmykia  (Chalmg  Tangtsh);  and  Shamanism,  whichis  still  practised  by
national minorities in Siberia. What distinguishes Islam in this respect is not only its
status as the largest religious community after the Russian Orthodox church, but also its
role in important foreign affairs and “geopolitical” issues, which are the subject of heated
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debate in Russia. Russia has dealings on a number of political stages with Muslims and
countries where Islam is in a majority, or at least an important minority religion. In its
foreign  policy  towards  Islamic  states,  some  of  which  were  previously  the  privileged
beneficiaries of the Soviet “third world policy”37, in its CIS policy towards six secessionist
states of the Soviet Union,  and finally in its regional policy towards members of  the
Russian Federation. In parliamentary and presidential elections Muslim political and legal
protection movements in Russia supported the political elite surrounding Yeltsin against
the challenge represented by conservatives to both the left and right, and in doing so also
acknowledged the liberalisation of Russia's regional policy since the start of the 1990's.
However, in its regional and nationality policies the Russian leadership has shown grave
conceptional  and organisational  failings,  and in the case of  the North Caucasus even
frightening incompetence.
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ABSTRACTS
North Caucasus  (which is  still  a  part  of  the  Russian Federation)  contains  seven autonomous
republics the population of which is more and more islamized as one goes from West to East:
Adygeya,  Karachevo-Cherkessia,  Kabardino-Balkaria,  North  Ossetia,  Ingushetia,  Chechnya and
Daghestan.  The  last  two  ones,  which  are  the  most  islamized,  are  studied  in  this  paper  in  a
comparative way. Chechnya has cultivated since the middle of the last century a tradition of
resistance to Russian imperialism in the name of Islam, which has been reactivated in the last ten
years in two wars opposing Chechen fighters to Moscow. However, the Chechen population is far
from unanimous in supporting this holy war: only the southern part of Chechnya, called Ichkeria,
is really mobilized against Russia, the northern part being ready for accommodation. Daghestan,
where islamisation is much older and deeper, similarly refused to mobilize against Russia. The
extent of the rebellion in this area has been exaggerated by Russian propaganda and Western
media: the dramatic escalation in the Chechnya war is due more to the incompetence of the
Russian  authorities  in  dealing  with  the  problem  than  to  the  combativeness  of  the  local
population.
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Le  Caucase  Nord  (toujours  partie  intégrante  de  la  Fédération  de  Russie)  comprend  sept
républiques autonomes dont la population est, si l'on se déplace d'Ouest en Est, de plus en plus
islamisée :  République des Adyghéens,  République de Karatchaevo-Tcherkessie,  République de
Kabardino-Balkarie, Ossetie du Nord, Inguchie, Tchétchénie et Daghestan. Les deux dernières, qui
sont  les  plus  islamisées,  sont  étudiées  de  façon  comparative  dans  le  présent article.  La
Tchétchénie a depuis un siècle et demi une tradition de résistance au pouvoir russe au nom de
l'islam qui a été réactivée depuis 1990 au cours des deux guerres qui l'ont opposée à Moscou. Cet
étendard de la guerre sainte est loin cependant de faire l'unanimité : seul le Sud montagneux,
l'Ichkérie, est vraiment mobilisé contre la Russie, le Nord étant prêt à composer. Le Daghestan,
plus  anciennement  et  plus  profondément  islamisé,  a  aussi  refusé  de  se  mobiliser  contre  le
pouvoir  russe.  L'étendue de la  rébellion dans cette  région a  été  exagérée par  la  propagande
officielle russe et par nos media : le caractère dramatique de la guerre de Tchétchénie doit plus à
l'incompétence de la Russie dans la gestion du conflit qu'à la combativité des population locales.
El  Cáucaso  norte  (aún  parte  integrante  de  la  Federación  Rusa)  comprende  siete  repúblicas
autónomas cuya población está, si nos desplazamos de Oeste a Este, cada vez más islamizada :
República  de  Adigea, República  de  Karatchevo-Cherkessia,  Repú-blica  de  Kabardino-Balcaria,
Ossetia del Norte, Ingushetia, Chechenia y Dagestán. Las dos últimas, las más islamizadas, son
estudiadas de manera comparativa en el presente artículo. Chechenia tiene, desde hace un siglo y
medio, una tradición de resisten-cia al poder ruso en nombre del Islam que ha sido reactivada
desde 1990, durante las dos guerras que la enfrentaron a Moscú. La bandera de la guerra santa
está lejos, sin embargo, de ser unánime : solo el sur montañoso, Ichkéria, esta verdaderamente
movi-lizado contra Rusia, mientras que el Norte está dispuesto a contemporizar. Dagestán, más
profunda y antiguamente islamizado, también ha rechazado movilizarse contra el poder ruso. La
extension de la rebelión en esta región ha sido exagerado por la propa-ganda oficial rusa y por
nuestros medios : el carácter dramático de la guerra de Chechenia debe más a la incompetencia
de Rusia en la gestion del conflicto que a la combatividad de las poblaciones locales.
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